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Abstract. Cieszkowski’s philosophy embodies the most influential trends in philosophy 
and culture of the nineteenth century. This does not mean, however, that Cieszkowski’s 
philosophy has today only historical character and it is good topic for some historians 
of philosophy. On the contrary. Although Cieszkowski used Post-Hegelian language 
and concepts, at the core his philosophy is an experience which has got a fundamen-
tal complexion. It is an experience of the dialectic of history. It underlies not only the 
history of philosophy of the nineteenth century, but also lies at the root of modern 
consciousness, as determined by hermeneutics and postmodernism. The ancestor of 
the transversal reason is a cunning reason of history. Postmodernism, which focuses 
on pluralism and diversity, is closely related to the era of the “end of history” and 
post­history. The last term, just as the “post­modernism” is a historiosophical concept. 
The present of Cieszkowski’s philosophy of history allows us better understanding the 
philosophical foundation of contemporary culture.
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It is a privilege of theology and philosophy to pose the questions 
for which one cannot find empirical answers. That is the nature of 
such questions, which relate to things fundamental and ultimate: 
they maintain their significance because no answers makes them be 
silent. There wouldn’t be questions about the meaning of history 
if that sense were manifested in the historical events themselves. 
On the other hand, history may seem meaningless only with respect 
to some ultimate sense. Disappointments occur only where there are 
expectations. The very fact that we make enquiries about the entire 
history with regard to sense and non-sense is itself historically condi-
tioned: that uncurbed indagation was given rise to by Judeo -Christian 
mindset. The serious enquiries about the ultimate meaning of history 
transcends all the possibilities of knowledge and takes our breath 
away: transports us into the vacuum, which can be filled only with 
faith and hope.
Löwith 2002, 7–8
The heritage of August Cieszkowski reminds us of the lens focused on the 
most influential philosophical and cultural movements of XIX century. His 
“philosophy of action”, which consists of his philosophical and social writ-
ings as well as his lavish political, social and economic involvement is – the 
“sum of an epoch” or – putting it in a different manner, following Hegel 
– “self-consciousness of an epoch”- in which his philosophy happened to 
emerge and evolve. The exceptional times and the place in which that phi-
losophy was called into being determine its strict belonging of ideological 
and historical nature. Cieszkowski was clearly aware of it: “Our times are 
grandiose and sublime. Each day I thank God that I was born in those days” 
(Cieszkowski 1972, 299). Because Cieszkowski’s thought reflects the entirety 
of the spiritual efforts of that epoch, it is impervious to being classified as 
only one of its aspects. There are well-known problems concerning order-
ing Cieszkowski’s philosophy in terms of the then philosophical tendencies 
(Walicki 1972; Jakubowski 1989). The richness of his philosophy is testified 
by both the extent of its inspirations – it is not only German and French 
philosophical tradition that inspired it but also the heritage of Polish ro-
manticism – and the range of influence it managed to exert. Having pre-
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served in itself the seminal plots of philosophy as it was in the first half of 
XIX century, it managed to creatively transform them by anticipating the 
philosophical issues of the latter half of XIX century. And as it was born in 
XIX century deriving its vital forces for its own development and so it died 
with the dawn of XIX century itself. Despite the Polish publications of the 
major works by Cieszkowski in the first decades of XX century, his thought 
was unable to compete with the new philosophy of Lvov-Warsaw school and 
neither could it compete with phenomenology. The absence of Cieszkowski’s 
philosophy in the thought of the previous century was not due to its lack of 
competitiveness but rather to its fervent historiosophical optimism, which 
was a disgrace when faced with the tragic events of the previous century. 
Even if we live in the times of fulfillment, it is definitely not the epoch of the 
Holy Spirit and even less the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth, while it is at best 
– according to Nietzsche’s prophecy and which was confirmed by (among 
others) Heidegger and Vattimo – the epoch of realized nihilism.
What is then what we except from the thought of August Cieszkowski, 
reminiscing over his philosophy on the occasion of his 200 birthday an-
niversary? Is it merely because of its strong affinity to the entirety of 
XIX-century culture, that we owe his philosophy the credit of remembrance 
exclusively due to some commemorative reasons and/or the reasons re-
lated to the interest in the history of philosophy as such (or else Polish 
philosophy)? Or, colloquially speaking: Cieszkowski’s philosophy is still 
valid!? Frankly speaking, my first contact with his philosophy terminated 
in its spontaneous dismissal. That’s why, instead of posing the questions 
concerning its validity, which questions necessarily subordinate the val-
ue of the past events to the current needs; I decided to ask the inverted 
question. Namely, instead of measuring the value of the work with our 
standards, I posed the question whether we – contemporary people – are 
“contemporary” enough to hear the calling of the future and accept the 
challenge of the past – in that case the past is identified with the thought 
by Cieszkowski. Are we ready to argue with the thinker from Wierzenica?
Does my inverted question contain anything more than indagating 
about what is universal about Cieszkowski’s works? Obviously one can 
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– and it is even advisable – take up and even take further such a type of 
attitude to the works of the past. With reference to Cieszkowski’s thought, 
it can be put in the following manner: though XIX century irrevocably 
stigmatized his philosophy, it cannot be measured solely by his position.
His philosophy seems to be not far from exemplifying the historical 
law of masterpiece: elevating what is local to the status of the universal. 
And that is not about its claims for being absolute but about its factual 
layer. Addressing that universality and emphasizing what is “contempo-
rary” in the eyes of Cieszkowski are certainly two different things. The 
latter is manifested when one exposes those threads in Cieszkowski’s 
thought which proved vital for philosophy and culture in XX and XXI 
century. These encompass, among others, the conviction that what we 
face is the end of philosophy (post-philosophism) and the belief the 
times are ripe for actions and that is the actions that are of social nature. 
Or the belief that humankind can consolidate under the idea of ecu-
menism and economy based on commonly shared values (Walicki 2005, 
132–133). Eventually, it might be shown that Cieszkowski’s thought 
bears some resemblance to such influential philosophical proposals of 
XIX and XX century as the philosophy of Marx, Nietzsche or existential-
ism. Instead, let us try to take heed of something else; namely, the so-
called “fundamental experience” – which concept laid the foundations 
for the cultural climate of XIX century and most of all for the philosoph-
ical works by Cieszkowski and which gave rise to experience determining 
the status of the contemporary man. This choice of the subject results 
from the deliberate and free decision of the author of the text; however, 
it does not mean that the choice is unmotivated. On the contrary, the 
choice stems from the post-Heideggerian hermeneutic and postmodern 
consciousness (which both delineate the contemporary mindset), in the 
centre of which there lies the concept of experience and that which is 
problematic. Before we embark on the deeper justification of that choice 
– the justification for which we will have to wait until we are fully aware 
of the decision we had made – let us recall the statement by Wodziński 
for advisory reasons:
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The history of “spiritual Europe” is the history of successive metaphysical 
epochs. The internal structure of each metaphysical epoch has a two-layer 
nature: characteristic historical experience and the ways of problematizing 
and articulating that experience. Each metaphysical epoch has its own char-
acteristic fundamental problem then: the question of questions (it may be 
a blend of interrelated questions), which emphasizes its spirit and determines 
its singularity. The metaphysical auto-construction of the epoch inevitably 
demands being faced with the fundamental problem of the epoch. Without 
that act, a metaphysical epoch lacks identity, the epoch cannot see its own 
reflection in any mirror. Its image remains blurred and amorphous (Wodziński 
1994, 603–604).
We claim that in the case of Cieszkowski’s thought, that fundamental or 
mystical experience – because “mysticism is undeniably indispensable for 
philosophy”, and mysticism is a “speculation in nuce”(Cieszkowski 1972, 
152) – is the experience of dialectics of history. It was expressed in the full-
est form in the XIX-century philosophy of history (Geschichtsphilosophie).1 
That suggestion must give rise to some misgivings. Trying to oppose it, one 
might say that among Cieszkowski’s beliefs his philosophy of history seems 
to be the thought that is the least appealing when perceived from today’s 
perspective. That is because it seems that “we are on the verge of the mod-
ern historical thinking” (Löwith 2002, 6). After the release of Prolegomena 
zur Historiosophie (1838), that sort of – historiosophical – attitude to histo-
ry had to defend itself against not at all unreasonable – as it transpired to 
be so having considered the upcoming aversion to whatever philosophy of 
history – objections to “making them metaphysical” and hence – to their 
falsification. The objections were pronounced by the adherents of clearly 
anti-metaphysical, that is a scientific, attitude to history. Its most out-
standing representative was the so-called German historical school. Even if 
we assume that the objections to the philosophy of history may be justified 
1 In the present paper, we use the same definitione of the term „philosophy of history” as 
used by K. Löwith: “the term »philosophy of history« means the systematic explanation of 
general history in the light of the principle, due to which historical events and successions 
are interconnected and they refer to some ultimate sense” (Löwith 2002, 5). 
3(1)/2015232
DA N I E L RO LA N D S O B OTA
and may confirm that it is philosophically unsound; we may, first of all, at 
the same time agree with those thinkers who can see the traits typical of 
the philosophy of history in the attitude to history as adhered to by the 
German historical school (Gadamer 1993, 199–216; Schnädelbach 1992, 
72–85). Second of all, we might note that, follow G. Vattimo, but for the 
philosophy of history, running counter to the data-gathering-kind-of his-
torical thinking (the philosophy of history for early Nietzsche was a remedy 
against historical thinking threating life itself – just to successively become 
superseded by Nietzsche himself with his “philosophy of daybreak”), there 
wouldn’t have been any possibility of establishing hermeneutic and post-
modern philosophy, which after all shaped the philosophical consciousness 
of the second half of XX century (Vattimo 2006, chapter X). Thirdly, we be-
lieve that the latter are the movements of strictly historiosophical nature. 
Thus, we assume the position that the questions posed by XIX-century 
philosophy of history and the experience of dialectics of history that lay its 
foundations have an invaluable inherent heuristic power. That power can 
be – and even must be – taken up and developed to appreciate the current 
philosophico-historical situation. To endorse the assumed strategy of the 
present paper, the strategy juxtaposing post-Hegelian philosophy of histo-
ry and contemporary intellectual movements, let us recall the words by the 
leading representatives of hermeneutics and postmodernism. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer says:” The dispute with Hegel has the central significance for the 
problem of hermeneutics” (Gadamer 1993, 323; idem 2006, 254). Wolfgang 
Welsch adheres to the above statement: “One can treat postmodernism 
as a consequence and the climax of post-Hegelian line of development” 
(Welsch 1998, 239).
As far as this suggestion of treating Cieszkowski’s philosophy of histo-
ry as a serious inspiration for contemporary thought goes, one must note 
that a hypothesis of this type relates both to the form and to the content 
of what we call “inspiration”. As far as the form goes, we do not treat 
the inspiration as a conscious borrowing or influence; however, referring 
back to its Latin etymon (inspirare) and the Western theological tradition, 
we just want to underline that it is all about some dialogical, spiritual 
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(spiritalis) community (communio) between the old and the new (Ratzinger 
1998, 324–327).2 Spirit, as it is widely known, is a basic figure in the phi-
losophy of history of XIX century. Spirit is history. His/its characteristic 
mode of being is a circular move of transcendence and mediation, the 
basis of which is formed by a certain internal distinction between not-be-
ing-itself or being-outside-itself. Hence, talking about the community of 
spirit has some dialectical and self-contradictory element because the 
spiritual community means the internal agony (the fight of a spirit with 
itself), which does not terminate in the demolition of the adversary but 
it does in maintaining and respecting it. That spiritual fight of the new 
against the old makes it hard to state any simple identity or the unambig-
uous distinctive sing of a given epoch and its most exquisite output. That 
is why it is right to say that although each epoch has its own sense and 
characteristics, the epochs, considering their geneses, still bear the traces 
they wanted to shake off. As Cieszkowski said: “any novelty is an act of re-
making” (Cieszkowski 1972, 26). Exposing that spiritual sense of the con-
cept of inspiration is to prevent thinking about inspiration as a conscious 
take-over. From that formal understanding of inspiration as the history of 
spirit, there follow definite entailments related to its content. On the one 
hand, it is certainly not easy to admit that historical consciousness, which 
elevated the history to the rank of a philosophical problem, has these days 
the same force determining the understanding itself and the world by the 
contemporary man as it did one hundred years ago. On the other hand, it 
is hard not to admit that although suspended, history remains still alive in 
a sense; namely, it serves as “the preparation and the premise” of the dom-
inating awareness of pluralism and cultural relativism. It is present in the 
discourse over “the crisis of culture”, “the end of history” as well as “civi-
lization war”. There would be no culture of the second half of XX century 
– shaped on the one hand by hermeneutic consciousness and on the other 
by postmodernism – if there were no XIX-century historical conscious-
ness and historism resulting from it (Schnädelbach 1992, 63–72). Whereas 
2 According to Augustine, Spirit in Trinity is the dialogical communion and oneness be-
tween Father and Son. Spirit is love and gift. 
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the latter, by situating the nations along the axis of time, demonstrated 
pluralism and the relativity of each artifact from the perspective being 
the integral moment of the entirety of “history”, which is incidentally 
what hermeneutic philosophy refers to; the postmodern vision of reality, 
confronting the variety of currently existing cultures, demonstrates “the 
same” from the available perspective of the global space, which one can 
avail of thanks to the latest technological inventions. The predecessor of 
transversal mind is the cunning spirit of history itself. That “immobility” 
of postmodern experience is often expressed with the help of oxymoron, 
that is as “the end of history” or briefly as ”post-history” (Vattimo 2006, 
6–7, 11).3 The latter term, quite like postmodernism itself is a historiosoph-
ical concept.
But the transition from the historical consciousness of XIX century 
to the mindset of the latter half of XX century, from the experience spec-
ified by general history to the experience controlled by the category of 
the global space was not implemented directly and smoothly; instead, it 
was like a leap over the abyss, the abyss being the events of the first half 
of the previous century. The road from XIX-century philosophy of histo-
ry to philosophy of the turn of XX and XXI century was beaten through 
“transitional reasoning”, “thinking in transition” – as it was put by Heide-
gger (Heidegger 1996, 13). Trying to grasp the hidden (non)sense of that 
thinking, which leads up to transcending any reflection operating on the 
ontological plane of distinction between Being-being and the axiological 
plane with the distinction now being good-evil, Cezary Wodziński chris-
tened it as “epiphany of evil”. “The way of existence of the man in the 
contemporary epoch is the way of existing of the participant and the wit-
ness of the materializing (being manifested) evil” (Wodziński 1994, 605). 
As far as that awareness of evil is concerned, one must state that in the 
3 Wolfgang Welsch rightly observes that the concept by Arnold Gehlen of “post-history” se-
mantically overlaps with the term “postmodernism”. In spite of that fact, according to our 
belief, that concept – bereft of any decadent semantic colourings – rightly connotes one 
of the aspects of postmodernism, which is flattening of that which before loomed far away 
from historical process to the current “now”. For the distinction between postmodernism 
and post-historism see also: Welsch 1998, 26–27. 
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context of the question about the need for the philosophical search for the 
meaning of history, that awareness is not only a symptomatic awareness 
of our times, but it is also and primarily the general premise of any philo-
sophical reflection on history as such. Cieszkowski’s philosophy of history 
also stems from the awareness of the great crisis (“what is happening in 
the world, the old world is dying, and the new is just getting born”), which 
not only incites the thought to ponder over history but also it calls the his-
tory itself into being. History is an incessant process of overpowering evil 
(Jakubowski 1989, 46, 53). Evil is a state of the tension inside the dialectical 
opposition. The opposites emerge as an answer to the question-solution 
(krisis). The fact that the reflection over history is connected with the ex-
perience of evil was very well explained by Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche 
observed that whereas happiness is related to the state of being hic et 
nunc, memory and reflecting back on the past takes shape when suffering 
(Nietzsche 1906, 57–59)4. Trying to understand suffering and evil, trying to 
impute some meaning to it and thus justify it somehow – that is because 
any explanation in search for reasons is the justification itself – the man 
weaves a story, the ultimate chapter (eschaton) which is being released 
from suffering, which brings consolation, and hence the termination of 
history itself. That is all connected with religion and faith in the power of 
redemption of God’s Providence. Even if in the early modern philosophy 
of history, one relinquishes any reference to religious contexts, there is 
still a lively belief as for the redemptive termination of history. It was only 
philosophy of history (embarked upon on the turn of XIX and XX century) 
which remains exceptional in this respect: it looks ahead to the future and 
it can only see the growing deterioration and the decadence. At the basis 
of that pessimism related to the evaluation of the forthcoming future, 
amounting to the mood of fin de siècle, there lies the loss of faith in the 
ordering power of God and the liberating message of religion. Speaking 
more broadly: the experience of the influence of what was called nihilism 
in XIX century. What that act of looking ahead to the future (which is 
4 The fact that learning and hence experience occurs while suffering has been known since 
Aeschylus (p£qei m£qoj) (cf. Gadamer 1993, 332). 
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a Christian act by nature) was deprived of its theological and metaphysical 
roots (Gott ist tot), the sense of the future itself changed. The future which 
does not guarantee the hope for executing our plans makes the decision 
void of plainness and leads to quietism. Hence, we witness, so frequently in 
the thought of the turn of XIX and XX century, de facto curious calling for 
making decisions “in the name of death” in the times of fulfilled nihilism. 
In this manner, the earlier metaphysico-theological courage (naivety?) of 
perceiving and finding in everything the Oneness, which was related not 
so much to the need of abolishing all the differences, but more to the ne-
cessity of exposing them – that is because the difference is sharply visible 
only within Oneness – it transforms into the awareness of resignation and 
indifferent manifesto of “anything goes”. This post-metaphysical state of 
being situated beyond differences but also beyond Oneness is called by 
Wodziński epiphany of evil.
Cieszkowski’s thought – more than the ideas of German idealism, 
which commenced XIX century, more than revolutionary ideas of early 
Hegelians, who running counter to academic philosophy filled their life 
with risk; but even more than neo-Kantian philosophy, which dreaming 
about the coherent system terminated XIX century in the trenches of the 
World War I – shows, sometimes purely negatively what were the premises 
allowing for the above-stated transitions from the historical conscious-
ness of XIX century through the early awareness of crisis – exemplified by 
war times and post-war times XX; up to the consciousness of the present 
century. In this vein, we will try to look once more at the chosen threads 
in Cieszkowski’s philosophy of history commencing our journey from that 
philosophy itself, bridging the gap through to the contemporary philo-
sophical standpoints concentrated around the idea of pluralism. Making 
use of the dialectical scheme of history, it might be formulated in that 
manner that XIX-century historiosophy by Cieszkowski exposing the dif-
ferences within Oneness and Oneness within differences is a thesis. Philos-
ophy of the first half of XX century, being located in its reasoning beyond 
differences is an antithesis. The thought of the latter half of XX century 
and the turn of XX and XXI century amounts to synthesis. What does this 
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synthesis involve? We are about to take a closer look after stating our 
premises of that dialectical syllogism, focusing mainly on the thought by 
A. Cieszkowski.
1. August Cieszkowski’s philosophy of history
In the letter dating back to June, 1836 addressed at his teacher, friend, 
publisher and a propagator of Hegels’s thought, that is Karl Ludwig Miche-
let, young Cieszkowski writes that his main interest is “the philosophy of 
spirit” and that he is intending to write the work called Dialectics of History, 
in which he “will be forced to fight Hegel” because the latter in his logic 
did discover “the timeless law of dialectics” and established “the type of 
philosophical deduction”; yet, he was far from applying his discovery to 
the philosophy of nature, “and even less to the philosophy of spirit” (Ciesz-
kowski 1972, 325–329). A few months later Cieszkowski resigns from this 
title since it is misleading in his opinion:
The reason for this misunderstanding lies in the confusion in the applica-
tion of the concept dialectical, which can have many meanings. For example, 
there is purely negative dialectics, that is the second order of logical process. 
There is subjective dialectics of Eleatics and finally there is this dialectics 
which I meant – true objective dialectics, the internal process from which the 
unity of opposites develops, the normal movement of an object in its organic 
genesis; the development of an idea is perceived as one whole (Cieszkowski 
1972, 333).
The task of detecting dialectics in the history will be called by Cieszkowski 
“the fundamental experience” (Cieszkowski 1922, 120)5. He concedes that 
Hegel did discover the idea of dialectics and he found in the history itself; 
5 The first outline of Lord’s Prayer before the German issue of Prolegomena in 1838. The 
direct inspiration for taking up the studies on his opus magnum – as he admitted himself 
during the conversation with his son – was the descension of the Holy Spirit upon him. 
It occurred while he was saying Lord’s Prayer, conducted together with his father Paweł 
(Paul) giving thanks to the thoughts expressed in the Polish manuscript of Prolegomena 
(cf. Cieszkowski 1908, I-II).
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however, he conceived of history in the limited sense; that is as the past 
and the present and not at the same time he did not perceive history in the 
organic sense, that is identifying history with the past, the present and the 
future. Thus, as he did not search for dialectics a priori but he discovered 
it a posteriori in the history, he could not exhaustively describe all the po-
tential inherent in history. It means that aprioristic construal of history is 
possible only by dint of considering that absolute a priori dimension, which 
is the future. Cieszkowski does not adhere to the idea of stopping history 
but that is not because he understands dialectics as the infinite negation 
but as the synthesis giving rise to the real oneness. The relation between 
dialectics of history and of the future – as conceived of by Cieszkowski – 
looks different to the standpoint assumed by young Hegelian adherents, 
who in turn noticed the dimension of the future but did so purely nega-
tively – as a permanent revolution. As far as Hegel (“the hero of history”) 
is concerned, in his thought dialectics operates in the trenches of the past 
and that is why, being confined to the realm of what is gone, it cannot ex-
haust its (positive) potential. Hegel’s dialectics was tailored for the needs 
of the phenomenology of the spirit and the science of logic; yet, when ap-
plied to history as such is afflicted with many shortcomings, excluding even 
the mentioned negligence of the fundamental significance, that is the ab-
sence of the aspect of the future. According to Hegel, history is terminated 
with the moment of the emergence of Hegel and Prussian country. It must 
be conceded that the history rolls on but without the complementation of 
what is gone with any additional sense. In Hegel’s philosophy, reason and 
reality, thought and being are reconciled: what is rational is real, what is 
real is rational (Hegel 1969, 17). It is all well-known how that famous thesis 
proceeded. “Hegelian rightists emphasized the fact it is only what is real is 
rational, while the leftists Hegelian stressed that it is only what is rational 
is also real” (Löwith 2001, 93). Cieszkowski’s thought is closer to the latter 
interpretation: “Because reason has now come as far as to overcome its in-
ternal contradictions, the identical victory must take place in reality” (Ciesz-
kowski 1972, 98). The conviction, shared with young Hegelian adherents, 
that being and thought are still at variance with each other is identical with 
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the said fundamental experience of dialectics as well as with the sentiment 
that the history still has the open-ended character and that is why it allows 
for cherishing hopes for the future. Due to the fact that dialectics, contra-
dictions, history, open-endedness, the future and hope are treated jointly 
– Cieszkowski, unlike young Hegelian adherents, make that fundamental 
experience of history won over by the experience of faith. That is because 
Christian faith is the experience of time in the modus of the future. That 
is why Hegelian end of history becomes in Cieszkowski’s thought not as 
much the end of the world as the end of philosophy (Hegel’s one). In other 
words: that assertion can be expressed in the form of an aphorism and so 
we might say that in Cieszkowski’s opinion philosophy ends where the 
future begins. That holds true as far as we regard the future as an epoch 
of the history. On the other hand, that would be a false statement when 
we realize that any past exists only as some realized future, which means 
that any period of the past is some future which had lapsed. According to 
Cieszkowski, Hegel’s decision to hold back and concentrate on the present 
stemmed from the fact that Hegel acted too passively, that is non-dialecti-
cally. The above-mentioned fundamental experience of dialectics of history 
did allow Hegel to introduce the so-far unknown dynamics into the realm 
of reasoning; yet, when it comes to nature and action Hegel was overly 
careful. Namely, he conceived of the events as they manifested themselves, 
whereas “the logos of history” is to be searched for actively. We are looking 
for “the systematic search for logic in history; whereas we can ascribe to 
Hegel only the speculative findings of history” (Cieszkowski 1972, 36). For 
Cieszkowski, investigating history is of the nature of searching. It results 
from the said experience of dialectics. The act of finding refers back to 
the past; searching is oriented towards the future. In accordance with this 
active-searching attitude towards history, Cieszkowski embarks on revis-
ing Hegel’s philosophy of history by posing three questions. Asking about 
the history is not the same as studying it and persisting in existence in 
it. A question as such is a special form of epistemological and existential 
activity. Cieszkowski completes his list of historiosophical questions ac-
cording to the manner, content and purpose:
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1. How? That is what is history and how it proceeds?
2. What? That is what content appears in each of the period of histor-
ical evolution?
3. Why? That is for what purpose the history goes on (the question of 
teleology)?
The answer to the first takes place in the realm of the construction, 
the second – deduction (realization), the third – extroduction (Cieszkowski 
1972, 32, 53, 334). These questions, which was talked about by Wodziński in 
the excerpt quoted, form a blend of questions of mutually related questions 
and they amount to the complex expression of metaphysical fundamental 
experience, which shaped the spiritual climate of XIX century.
The fact that the answer to the first question is called „construction” 
by Cieszkowski does not mean that the results of „petty speculation” or any 
arbitrary conceptual schemes are not admissible. The attempt to answer 
the first question stems from the persistent holding on to the fundamental 
experience, which is dialectics of history and it leads to the vital correction 
of Hegel’s vision of history.6 It does not occur at once obviously and it is not 
a revolutionary correction. The concept of “real objective dialectics of life” 
(Cieszkowski 1972, 98) certainly refers to the well-known Hegel’s thought 
that any development of reason and being is performed as a transition from 
thesis through antithesis to synthesis. That transition means at the same 
time cancellation as well as preservation of what is cancelled (Aufhebung). 
Each of the constituents of that “great syllogism of the spirit of the world” 
(Cieszkowski 1972, 16) is what it is only being assisted by the other constit-
uents, which means that none of them has any substantial character but it 
has only the functional one. They are like the left and the right hand, like 
top and bottom, like question and answer. It is true that in the word ‘abso-
lutum’, there resonates the unconditionality and unqualifiedness; yet, for 
Cieszkowski, the Absolute is “omni-conditionality and omni-qualifiedness” 
6 That starting point – related to dialectics – and the „universal reference point” of Ciesz-
kowski’s thought, which reference point, despite its proximity, distinguishes itself both 
from Hegel himself as well as from neo-Hegelians – that starting point was emphasized 
by M.N. Jakubowski and M. Kozłowski (cf. Jakubowski 1989, 11–17; Kozłowski, 1996, 105). 
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(Cieszkowski 1922, 108). The author of Prolegomena…, more strongly than 
Hegel, accentuated the internal contradictions occurring in each of the 
constituents of the antithesis. Each contradiction, including the contra-
diction between the thought and being, ensures the internal dynamics to 
history. Life is a tension between contradictions, a spiral movement divided 
into twists (Cieszkowski 1922, 106–107, 117).
Any progress, any life is and must be a series of fights, and if anybody denies 
those fights would deny the life itself. Any fight is indeed a dualism, is a fric-
tion, teasing, producing a tension where mutually opposite elements overcome 
each other. Fight is indeed a purpose, the accident and the destiny of a fight 
is a lively peace. The most faithful portrayal of such a peace is represented by 
a healthy Organism (Cieszkowski 1922, 139).
The concept of organism is „the physical category of general history”. 
Apart from physical categories, which encompass for instance the catego-
ries of mechanics and chemistry, “symbolically-typical categories” of light, 
magnetism, electricity and finally “real categories”, which has the natural 
influence on history and constitute its physical foundations, Cieszkowski 
enumerates first and foremost logical categories and then spiritual ones 
(Cieszkowski 1972, 31–47). Their deduction takes place while answering 
the second (what?) of the above-stated questions related to the philosophy 
of history. Comparing history with organism, which simultaneously sym-
bolizes one of the moments in history – namely, the forthcoming future 
as a stage of the fulfillment of time and the performance the destiny of 
history, as an Epoch in which all the so-far contradictions will be recon-
ciled – as well as all the history; so the very comparison was quite popular 
on the one hand in German philosophy of romanticism, which treated the 
opposition of spirit and nature as a superficial distinction, on the other 
hand – in the emerging sociological thought, which regarded social life in 
organic and evolutionary terms.7 Perhaps then that mode of functioning 
7 It is worth mentioning that in the year of issuing Prolegomena, August Comte first used 
the term “sociology”. Among many different analogies (and the same number of discrep-
ancies) between Cieszkowski’s thought and sociology of the latter half of XIX century, the 
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of objective spirit justified and endorsed the use of the organism meta-
phor. As Cieszkowski pointed out, that which comprises “the grander of 
our time” is “striving for the real and harmonized organization”; “our times 
is the period of emergence, and the approaching of organization” (Ciesz-
kowski 1972, 299). What encourages to draw a comparison between history 
and organism is incidentally the very category of life, which can be suc-
cessfully applied to describe human existence (as in the later philosophy of 
life) and to the existence of a living organism (as in biology). In accordance 
with that organistic vision of history, Cieszkowski compares it – as Johann 
Gottfried Herder used to do before – also with the seed or the tree. The 
comparison between history and a living being entails that because “the 
cessation of an internal fight within the organism is death”, the internal 
fight in history will never cease to exist; even when that organism of histo-
ry will reach its destination. Reconciling dialectical contradictions does not 
involve the cessation of any movement and the evaporation of any tension 
but it involves their harmonized adjustment. The fight cannot be annulled 
but introduced. It relates to “harmonized fight”. „Harmony without the 
fight is an abstraction” (Cieszkowski 1923b, 119–122).
The application of dialectical syllogism and the physical category of 
organism to the philosophy of history leads to a significant rectification of 
Hegelian philosophy of history. What comes to the fore is the issues related 
to periodization (Pot 1999, 1. main part, 3. part; Sobota 2010, 731–764). 
Every division of history into periods must be based on some or the other 
criterion. The experience of the dialectics of history and the structure of 
dialectical syllogism emerging from it hints at the fact that history should 
not be divided into two or four – as Hegel attempted to do – but into three. 
The metaphor of organism on the other hand, the organism functioning 
properly only when there is an internal fight within it going on, that is 
fact of treating societies in terms of the philosophy of history should be mentioned first. 
The application of the above conceptualization is confirmed by the use of such concepts 
as development, progress, periodization etc. As far as periodization is concerned, quite 
like Cieszkowski, it was also Comte who divided the history of humanity into three peri-
ods (cf. Szacki 2011, chapter VIII-IX). 
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when it develops and materializes its life functions with procreation com-
ing to the limelight; introduces to the reasoning over history the element 
of future. What is important here is the fact that Cieszkowski does not 
only mean the alteration of the typology of what is gone but primarily the 
strict interconnection between history and the essence of time. Because 
the essence of time is not located in time itself, Cieszkowski might as well 
say that history coincides with eternity. History proceeds along the axis 
of time and its internal divisions are correlated with its three dimensions. 
The fulfillment of time, which Cieszkowski associates with the future, does 
not involve the simple state of time arriving at some terminus, or the ex-
haustion of the future for the sake of the past, after which there would be 
merely timeless existence. Instead, what it means is for time to reach its 
essence, folding the past, the present and the future, thickening of time 
in its essence, concentration and filling time with itself. That moment, in 
which time becomes what it is, is the future. The knowledge on it is the 
teleology of history. Being the knowledge of the future, Cieszkowski’s his-
toriosophy certainly cannot embrace the information concerning particular 
events. If we mark the most outstanding part of the author of Ojcze Nasz 
[Lord’s Prayer] philosophy of history as praescentia (as pre-knowledge) or 
provisional knowledge, then it might be concerned only about the essence 
(Apriori). The expression of that knowledge is the prayer Ojcze nasz [Lord’s 
Prayer], which demands the appropriate interpretation. There is a similar 
problem in Plato’s thought; yet, unlike in Plato’s philosophy, Cieszkowski’s 
pre-knowledge does not refer to the past but to the future. It means that 
it is not a sort of knowledge that prepares a subject to recognize what is 
forthcoming; it is neither knowledge of contemplative nature, but it is 
knowledge which allows for cognition as action. Although from the knowl-
edge of the essence of the future does not follow what will inevitably occur 
– between the necessity of the essence and the adventitiousness of what is 
out there is a chasm – it is still the case that this knowledge acquires the 
certainty through the fact that the future depends on the realization of that 
knowledge in the action itself. Thus, it is knowledge which reassures itself 
in the free action. That is why the end of history is at the same time the 
3(1)/2015244
DA N I E L RO LA N D S O B OTA
commencing point of it. Only in the Opening Epoch, the Kingdom of Action 
is possible. “The philosophy of history is opening before us the sealed books 
of Daniel” (Cieszkowski 1972, 13) – Cieszkowski concludes.
The philosophy of history conducted to its logical ends must relinquish 
itself and become the “practical philosophy” or “the philosophy of practice” 
(Cieszkowski 1972, 87). As a social act, it is at the same time “active intui-
tion” being the basis of each kind of mysticism. As was rightly noted by P. 
Bartula “in the philosophy of action Cieszkowski overcomes the dualism 
of spiritual and practical activity. The mystical bound with the Absolute is 
not inconsistent with the practical activities in the Earthly life” (Bartula 
2006, 37). Hence, following the typical typology of world-views present-
ed by Karl Jaspers, Cieszkowski’s philosophy of history may be called the 
mysticism of the demonic type (Jaspers 1919, 394–395). It involves the 
dialectic conjunction of mysticism which searches for other-worldly God 
with the total denial in the name of what is earthly. Demonic mysticism – 
quite unlike ecstatic mysticism of Plotinus – is “the mystique in the world 
of objects”, is an action and working for the sake of this world. That is 
the action in which there is an eternal sense and meaning. According to 
Jaspers, Kantian mysticism is the one of that sort. Recalling the thought 
by the philosopher from Konigsberg, we can thereby confirm the remark 
by Marek Szulakiewicz, who stated that Cieszkowski’s philosophizing is 
in accordance with Heidelbergian tradition “suspended between Kant and 
Hegel” (Szulakiewicz 2004, 19–20).
That strict relation between the trichotimic division of history with the 
emphasis laid on the future, in which the time will fulfill itself – certainly 
dates back to traditional Christian historiosophy, whose paradigmatic ex-
ample was established by St. Augustine. The supremacy of Cieszkowski’s 
historiosophy over revolutionary ideas entertained by young Hegelians as 
well as the later prophets of the grim future such as Nietzsche or Spengler, 
rests of the fact that Cieszkowski is aware that any philosophy of the future 
is genetically and essentially connected with Judeo-Christian epos.
Those „sealed books” suggest that history might have the character 
of mystery. Mystery is „a contradiction which has not been solved yet” 
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(Cieszkowski 1922, 173). On some other occasion, Cieszkowski resorts to 
the concept of a riddle. In accordance with Aristotle’s observation having 
it that “the essence of a riddle is that by talking about what is really out 
there it combines impossibilities”, Cieszkowski is attempting to reproduce 
the authentic character of the reality of history by those means. The an-
tithesis assumes the form of a riddle- quite similar to the one posed once 
by Sphinx to Oedipus:
Because each antithesis, each substantive contradiction is a kind of a riddle, 
similar to the ancient Sphinx overpowered by Oedipus. Once the solution to the 
riddle is grasped, once its word is revealed – then the real riddle de facto solves 
itself: the said mysterious Sphinx collapses and disappears.
Until now then, the progress of humankind was a similar sort of substantive 
riddle – a bundle of insuperable contradictions – Sphinx not allowing us 
to go further because we had not guessed his words. Guessing the words of 
that riddle simultaneously means the contradictions being impervious to 
their mutual reconciliation (Cieszkowski 1922, 119).
Finally, for the description of the essence of history, its impenetrability 
and contradictions, Cieszkowski – also the Neo-Kantians of the Marburg 
as well as Baden school will express their beliefs in the similar tone – uses 
the concept of the equation with the variable X. “That x […] denotes the 
moments of the future” (Cieszkowski 1972, 340).
Comparing history with an equation and categorizing history into 
three epochs, which correspond with three moments of dialectical syllo-
gism, being something like mathematical power (ibidem, 71), reveals the 
mathematics-like oversimplifications. Is it valid to resort to that sort of 
reasoning in historiosophy? – Cieszkowski is wondering. The answer seems 
surprising. On the one hand, it appears that “mathematics cannot develop 
the whole range of concepts; it is beyond the shadow of a doubt” (ibidem, 
71). On the other hand, because the category of quantity – in Cieszkowski’s 
account – precedes the concept of quality (ibidem, 259), “mathematical 
inductions” are the basis of histiorosophical process. Mathematics “is the 
basis of everything” (ibidem 71). That „justification of the philosophical 
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system by resorting to a mathematical basis” is not a subtle correction of 
Hegel’s system but a serious proposal to be developed in the future.
From it, there will result the recognition of the whole mathematics as not only 
purely logical but even as the fundamental domain in logic. Furthermore, it will 
commence the whole system of knowledge not from ontological specifications, 
which are too substantive at the very beginning, but from numbers and formal 
relations (ibidem, 259–260).
And then again, it must be noticed that courageous, however unimplement-
ed, mathematical proposal of conceiving of historical reality is not merely 
some complementation of the fundamental experience of the dialectics of 
history but it is an attempt at its even stricter formulation. Within the realm 
of dialectical understanding of history, each category has its own genesis, 
which proceeds according to thrichotomic typology. However, since the very 
understanding of history has its genesis, the situations recurs at every level 
of reflection ultimately giving rise to something which resembles the math-
ematical structure of self-similarity, which was spectacularly developed in 
the early geometry of fractals. Obviously Cieszkowski could not follow the 
consequences of that comparison, but his vision of the worlds within the 
worlds of historical reality in which “everything is reflected in everything 
else because one principal thought permeates the essence of everything” 
(ibidem, 32), almost like a blend of Leibniz’s monads – makes this parable 
more likely.
Another symbol is – this time of geometro-theological nature, to which 
Cieszkowski willingly refers together with other romanticists, is the pic-
ture of the cross. History is laid-out leaning on the idea of the cross; the 
horizontal crossbar representing the current succession of events. If one 
considers the history as a whole, it seems to assume the shape of a sur-
face on which the point representing “the current” moves along almost 
as the light of the scanner. If two consecutive events constitute “eternal 
continuity” of historical process (“longitudinal section”), then simulta-
neous events occurring on the plane of history “adjacently to each other” 
(“cross section”) in which particular nations take part, they form a special 
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distinctness (Discretion)”, “multifarious and independent circles” (ibidem, 
25). History is an intersection of the diachronic and synchronic orders. Or, 
as put by Cieszkowski, an intersection of one time and different places, one 
place and many times (Cieszkowski 1922, 196). When disentangled, that 
thought leads to an interesting picture of history as an explosion, as a re-
sult of which one obtains an infinite number of worlds – something similar 
to Pascal’s conception of “infinite spaces”. According to the fundamental 
experience of dialectics, history demonstrates the absolute multi-depend-
ence, which in turn determines each of their individual moments by re-
ferring to any other moment. Only history as a whole, understood as an 
Absolute, does not have its external point of reference any longer. It means 
that any wordings once used to describe the opposition of that (historical) 
reality and something other which was supposed to transcend the former 
– as for example, the real and the ideal, here and there, the world and the 
other-worldly, the immanent and the transcendent, the temporal and the 
timeless, laity and divinity etc. – they all make sense only within history. 
There is no one exclusive and neither two worlds,
But there is an animate varying world – the grandiose world, omni-eternal 
(universe) composed of various limited world, ramifying into layers merging 
into one another, unfolding and folding different positions which despite their 
relative fleeting still co-last and fulfill the former world.
That common world – that is Heaven – embracing the multitude and millions 
of the world – and among those millions one is called Earth (ibidem, 195).8
That dialectical transition of some worlds into others; what is here into 
what is there, the transition of Earth into Heaven etc. is the “immanent di-
alectics”, the transition from the potential to the actual; of what is merely 
implicite into explicite. That concept by Cieszkowski oscillates about the 
idea which can be referred to as – following A. Walicki – “terrestrialization 
of eschatology” – the idea typical of millenarian movements, according to 
8 Cf. Cieszkowski 1923a, 239 and the following. The above description of the “economy of 
the world” revokes a very similar picture of reality found in Nietzsche (cf. Nietzsche 1905, 
448–449). Nietzsche calls it Dionysian world. It i also Goethe’s worldview that can be 
subsumed under the same vision (cf. Löwith 2001, 41). 
3(1)/2015248
DA N I E L RO LA N D S O B OTA
which the early transcendent eschatology is essentially Earthly eschatology 
(Walicki 1972, XXXIV-XXXV).9 It entails the need for “the restauration of 
matter” then (Cieszkowski 1972, 86). With reference to its frenetic concep-
tion of reality, that dialectical movement was called by Cieszkowski, follow-
ing French thinkers, “objective eternal recurrence” (Cieszkowski 1922, 196).
From the above, it follows that when Cieszkowski states that “only one 
thing stands above history and that is Absolute Spirit, God. That is why, 
while everything else in the world is subject to history, all those other 
things are subject to God” (Cieszkowski 1972, 48) – that assertion should 
not be construed in that manner as if the said God were to be an entity 
transcending historical reality. God was a transcendent entity relative to 
historical reality. What must be conceded is “the combination of God with 
the world and adjusting the world to God”. It is reducible to “the ascension 
to Heaven of Earth and the descension of the Kingdom of Heaven onto 
Earth” , “omni-perfectionism of God” (Cieszkowski 1923a, 262–263). God 
is the principle of history, history is God crucified, which is the permanent 
paradox for people’s common sense.
From the commonsensical position we might say: There is no contradiction in 
God, and speculation elevates those contradictions to the very climax and thus 
it melts them in the greatest Oneness, not resigning from the power of their 
differential. And that is why the speculation is allowed to say: God is full of 
contradictions because he is the greatest Oneness and the basis for all possible 
contradictions (Cieszkowski 1972, 74).
There are also other formulations that correspond to that concept of God 
as a principle of history unfolding in accordance with the dialectical pat-
tern. These formulations remind us of the already-mentioned principle 
of self-similarity, according to which each category not only describes 
what is dialectical but is also subject to the dialectical law of development. 
It means that history itself has some history within itself. Spirit, emerging 
9 On the secular chiliasm of revolutionary thought in XIX century v. Mannheim 1992, 
174–179. 
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from Nature, ultimately creates the history of mankind, which is in turn 
something like a highest peak or the top of the world. It can be also said 
that history is, on the one hand, a microcosm in which the history of the 
world presents itself in nuce, and on the other hand, it is a macrocosm, 
sensorium commune of the world; that is because that is in them that the 
universe reaches its maximum of meaning (ibidem, 33, 48).
As far as the provisional summary of the above-stated Cieszkowski’s 
historiosophy, one can enumerate at least a few attempts at grasping the 
essence of history on the basis of the fundamental metaphysical expe-
rience, which is the said experience of the dialectics of history. Hence, 
history is the materialization of the dialectical syllogism, the conflict of 
opposites, organism, a mystery, equation, surface, cross, the synthesis of 
immanence with transcendence, sensorium commune of the world, micro- 
and macrocosm, Absolute and Judgment Day.
2. The philosophy of history and the contemporary  
awareness of pluralism
To what degree can the afore-stated historiosophical vision of Cieszkowski, 
which is the expression of the epochal experience of the dialectics of histo-
ry, can be regarded as an inspiration for contemporary thought?
In the face of what XX century brought about, the philosophical agen-
da by Cieszkowski must have revealed the helplessness quite similar to 
the one the absolute idealism by Hegel was subject to. As an antithesis to 
optimistic-reconciliatory message of the author of God and palingenesis, 
there appeared on the turn of centuries the all-embracing cultural feeling 
of being blasé and discouraged. Nihilism, prophesied by philosopher and 
writers of XIX century, disclosed shortly its cruel countenance in the form 
of two world wars and the division of the world by dint of the iron curtain. 
It is hard to envisage a stronger antithesis to “the Kingdom of Heaven 
on Earth” than Auschwitz and Kolyma. Searching for the oneness with-
in a variety (the well-known synthetic both-and) terminated in the first 
half of the previous century with the attempt to create the civilization of 
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the ultimate exclusion (either-or). After that epoch of the total destruc-
tion, the whole culture became problematic: not only its most subtle and 
ephemeral form, that is poetry (Adorno). Let us return to the experience 
of the dialectics of history laying foundation to the syllogism of the last 
two centuries: as an antithesis to the above-mentioned vision of Ciesz-
kowski, there appeared the epoch of transition, in which the consistent 
destruction of any ontological and axiological differences and uniformities 
was conducted. Wodziński calls it “an epiphany of evil”. As much as the 
awareness of history tried to march across history and transcend it by dint 
of cancellation (Aufhebung), the transition between it and the epoch of 
evil, which followed it, occurred as a result of overcoming (Überwindung). 
The latter stems from the logic of what should be overcome and it is its 
fulfillment (the end of history). Let us recall that the antithesis of the dia-
lectical syllogism not only occurs as a mere negation of assertive contents 
but, by negating them it unravels their truth, which in turn it accommo-
dates and thus it contradicts itself in the end thus creating the tension 
in need of some solution. Following Wodziński, one can say- one it could 
be possible but for the fact that dialectics of that sort has any meaning 
only as far as what is rational and historical goes, and hence it becomes 
a nonsense in the post-historical epoch (Kozłowski 1996, 109) – that after 
a assertive epoch of axiological and ontological differences, there comes 
an anti-assertive epoch characterized by the lack of any differences at all 
(the epiphany of evil). The final moment of that antithesis or a sing of the 
forthcoming synthesis is the culture of the first decades of the half of XX 
century. It is conceived of not as an effect of Aufhebung or Überwindung, 
but as an effect Verwindung – „folding” and „bending” but also „suffering 
from the loss of” and „recovery”.
What experience lays foundation to the cultural climate of the second 
half of XX century? At the first glance, it might seem that is the experience 
of extreme indifference, fragmentation, dispersion, which slowly but stead-
ily transform into a positive experience of pluralism. The latter sentiment 
emerges from the landscape of post-war tatters and rags. The historical 
awareness revealed the variety which it tried to assimilate within Oneness. 
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In that way, the variety assumed the form of contradiction; there emerged 
the state of tension and conflict. In the culture of evil, it was attempted 
that this tension should be relieved through the “total war” leading to the 
exclusion of all the differences. Instead of homogenous oneness, there 
emerged a grim void. In the world of the second half of XX century, par-
ticular components of that variety – almost like young grass seeds after 
the forest conflagration, still in smoke, stink and still threatened with the 
successive outburst of fire – they slowly started to fill the emptied space. 
Variety appeared, the variety not seeking for the confrontation, the ele-
ments of which co-exist adjacently to one another, apart from one another 
or without one another. The epoch of leaving the shadow and enjoying our 
existence, however wounded, limping, lonely and guilty, void of the past 
and the future that existence might be – who would be ready to willfully 
reminisce over such past and what things of interest might the future after 
that epoch might bring? Still, that is the existence after all. The epoch of 
planetary carpe diem and aesthetic triumph of variety and individualism. 
The time of reorganization but now not on the basis of organism but on 
the basis of patchwork art. This time of solstice Vattimo calls (following 
Heidegger) the process of overcoming (Verwindung) of history specified by 
metaphysics. Overcoming metaphysics does not mean, as earlier, its tran-
scendence (Überwindung), being carried out under the auspices of some new 
principle of determining the future but means such a reference to the past 
that is its re-occurrence (Wiederholung) and “thinking about” (An-denken). 
That turn to the past does not occur because the past is the whole Truth but 
because there is no Truth and what is left is the sum of the acts of search-
ing and going astray which befell mankind each time it opens itself to the 
world (Vattimo 2006, 160–165). That position virtually coincides with the 
hermeneutic concept of experience, which – as put by Gadamer having 
followed Hegel – essentially has historical and dialectical nature (Gadamer 
1993, 330). Even if in Gadamer’s account it is not the same concept of his-
tory and dialectics, which occurs in Hegel’s account, it has some meaning 
only when the historical awareness is still holding, hermeneutics being 
the successor of the said historical awareness. Even if Gadamer’s thesis is 
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right, it means that our decision as to the way of presenting Cieszkowski’s 
historiosophy, the way involving laying the experience of the dialectics of 
history in the centre of the system – the turn, which, as it transpires now 
is the double pleonasm – the thesis departed from the slowly receding but 
hermeneutic-postmodern attitude (which still affected the contemporary 
consciousness, and therefore also ours) and it aimed at the clarification of 
that awareness by revoking those elements of the past which are its present 
contents. Cieszkowski’s account of history (presented above) is closer to 
hermeneutic concept of experience as described by Gadamer than to Hegel 
thought because, first, due to the dimension of future being incorporated 
into history it remains in accord with the key principle (for hermeneutics) 
of openness and variety; second, as a result of the combination of the fu-
ture with the action, it does justice to the hermeneutic primacy of what is 
practical; and third finally, it expressed the experience of history through 
interpretation (The Lord’s Prayer).
Yet, we stated before that hermeneutico-postmodern reasoning is in 
a sense in retreat these days or at least it lost its provocative vein. Even if 
one can doubt its real termination, it is certain that nobody is deluded into 
thinking that as far as the awareness of history goes, we are witnessing its 
fading away; thus, hermeneutics, which had emerged and evolved from the 
awareness of history, must be redefined. What comes into the limelight is 
the belief that we are living today in the epoch of post-postmodernism and 
post-hermeneutics (whatever it means). What seemed binding still in the 
eighties and early nineties of XX century, is insufficient on the turn of XX 
and XXI century after the rise and blistering expansion of virtual reality 
and all the life transformations attached to it. That new digital realm of 
communication between people and things, being a “new” manifestation of 
the reign of the essence of technology, being understood – having followed 
Heidegger – as Verwindung Ge-stell (literally “framing”) (Heidegger 2002, 
22).10 That epoch is christened by many authors even as the epoch of real 
“reconciliation” of the Spirit with itself. If one of the leading ideas of his-
10 Cf. also Vattimo 2006, 160–168.
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torical awareness – Nietzsche must be mentioned in this context – was the 
belief that history involves transience and “becoming”, that history is an 
interplay and the conflict of different forces. Whereas some of these forces 
are prevailing, the others disappear, it must be said that with reference to 
the contemporary post-historic state of affairs, nothing disappears and 
nothing is transient. Everything got stand and presents itself as being at 
each time at our disposal.
So, when Gadamer says:
Wilhelm von Humboldt perceived the characteristic fulfillment of the Spirit in 
the richness of grandiose individual forms the Spirit is characterized by, [and 
with reference to Herder, the historical worldview posited that] the variety of 
individual phenomena characterizes not only Greek but any historical life as 
such and that what the value and the meaning of history involves. […] and at its 
basis there is a formal idea of variety. That ideals is truly universal. It cannot be 
in principle shaken by an experience of history and neither by the astounding 
proof of miserability of human affairs. What apparently counts against that 
meaning – the transience of everything what is earthly – amounts to its real 
foundation. In transience, there is a mystery of inexhaustible productivity of 
historical world (Gadamer 1993, 203).
Then today’s cessation of transience causes not only the uniformization 
of everything but rather by dint of Verwindung (overcoming and bending) 
tightening the said historical variety (subject to Verwindung) in the current 
“now” of virtual reality. “(…)” the simultaneity of what is non-simultane-
ous, became the new nature” (Welsch 1998, 298). Using Cieszkowski’s ter-
minology, longitudinal section of history was folded, bent and incorporated 
into the cross section. After the “death of God”, what remains from the 
historical cross was only a cross bar – suspended in the air, the forced open-
ness (symbolized by the open arms of crucified Jesus stuck to the wooden 
cross). The openness is forced because, whether we want it or not, we are 
destined to it. If the discourse about philosophical history is to make any 
sense, the history cannot be understood diachronically but synchronically. 
Thus, the task of contemporarily understood philosophy of history would 
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overlap with what, for instance, Welsch describes as the transversal reason. 
The latter proves to be “quite a characteristic form of postmodern reason” 
and “all its operations process horizontally and involves transitions” be-
tween the types of rationality of different types (ibidem, 406–407). That 
transition of the reason amounts to its transitory, historical being: “There 
is no reason, reason is in the state of “becoming” and it is “becoming” not 
elsewhere but in its own processes. Some people might be annoyed that we 
are approaching Hegel from different angles” (ibidem, 425, 427). Yet, can’t 
we ask, aren’t we closer to Cieszkowski?
At the first glance, this sort of juxtaposition of the philosophy of histo-
ry with the contemporary awareness of pluralism seems ridiculous. Welsch 
plainly dismisses the suspicion of the resemblance of traversal reason to 
Hegelian reason of history, by stating that it must be conceded that both of 
them is a reason transitioning opposites; yet, these transitions the reason 
of history realizes with the ultimate goal in mind, which is the totalizing 
entirety (ibidem, 429–430). Transversal reason resigns from the insight 
into such an entirety. However, it must be noted that neither does Welsch 
dismiss the entirety but he presupposes its weaker form. Otherwise, it 
would be difficult for him to speak about the difference and the variety of 
rationality, at the same time not assuming full arbitrariness (ibidem, 178). 
Each transition demands some terra comparationis. That is why Welsch 
anyway smuggles some idea of entirety even if it is not clearly defined 
there. It can be corroborated by such phrases as “the immanent correlation 
and the intersection”, “environment, cancelling contradictions, “masterful 
reconciliation” (ibidem, 408, 422, 407, 440), or finally the statement that 
“reason despite its various forms amounts to oneness” (ibidem, 405).
Even if the difference between the traversal reason and the under-
standing of history, as far as their unifying function goes, is not so humon-
gous as it might seem at the first glance, there still appears to be a problem 
while searching for the similarities between the account by Welsch and 
Cieszkowski. Namely, it is all about the said connection between history 
and time mentioned in the thought of the author of God and palingenesis. 
If the statement that nowadays history is getting concentrated on the pres-
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ent, thus becoming the practice of mediation between particular discrete 
(Discretion) discourses or rationalities is right – Cieszkowski speaks about 
“various and independent circles” and the multitude of the worlds – then 
we rather adhere to the timeless (Hegelian one) concept of history, in the 
light of which what happens is what had happened and so it is and can-
not be otherwise. We mentioned earlier that Cieszkowski transcended this 
understanding of history which conceptualizes it as narrowed down to the 
past, resp. the present, complementing it with the dimension of future. 
Thus, he rigorously connected history with time, bestowing upon history 
the open-ended character. So, is it justifiable to identify the present with 
the future and encapsulate the entirety of time within the space of the 
present? Let’s take note of the said concept of Verwindung (overcoming). 
The fulfillment of time in the future, which Cieszkowski talks about, in-
volves folding and the concentration of time in its essence and thereby 
the transition from time to eternity. The latter, despite some immobility, 
is characterized by the internal dynamism, which can be called (following 
Heidegger – by the cognomen used earlier to characterize the modus of 
the Spirit’s existence), “being-out-of-itself” (Ausser-sich) (Heidegger 2006, 
329; idem, 2004, 413–414), and thus a “radical difference”. Thus, today’s 
present, in which history got bent and unfolded and thus history became 
actual. That vision might be compared to Cieszkowski’s account of the 
future, in which time got filled with itself. In that open-ended present/fu-
ture, reason is searching for the pathways between particular – subjective 
and objective and absolute ones – forms of the Spirit, which Welsch calls 
the types of rationality. The transversal reason is a cross-type reason of 
history, the historical reason is a longitudinal transversal reason. One of 
the most important problems of contemporary philosophy oriented at the 
affirmation of pluralism is the issue of the possibility of the co-existence 
of the variety. The aim is to reach some weak form of harmony. Dialogue, 
consensus, co-existence, democracy – are the slogans which still drive the 
discussion of the contemporary theoreticians of culture. That is the issue 
of dialogic (dialectics), which would enable to reach the consensus between 
conflicted parties. What sort of logic is the transversal reason governed by 
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and what does the “logos of history” involve? The task for transversal rea-
son, which is the faculty of self-reflection (überlegendes Vermögen), Welsch 
defines relatively to particular types of rationality in the following manner: 
verifying and explaining the structures and „internal demands for par-
ticular rationalities”, „explaining, articulating and comparing and thanks 
to these: correcting the errors within particular types of rationality and 
discovering the gaps in the profile of rationality and […] allowing for their 
development” (Welsch 1998, 420). These tasks of the reason, unfortunately, 
remind us of, contrary to what Welsch professer, the tasks of intellect. Is 
the difference between reason and intellect to be predicated on the fact 
that the latter is the faculty of “rigorous comprehension and exercising 
concepts in one domain” (ibidem, 405)? Isn’t the transversal reason real-
ly – despite the assurances by Welsch – in comparison with the intellect 
“the faculty of comprehension at a higher and fuller level” (ibidem, 406)? 
To avoid the danger of equating reason with the intellect it is not enough 
to attribute to the former larger competences but its distinct logic must be 
proven. In Cieszkowski’s thought, the transitions between various manifes-
tations of the Spirit is the dialectical process. The logic of history involves 
the realization of the dialectical syllogism. Certainly, for the representative 
of the type of reasoning free from schematic generalizations, it is a misun-
derstanding to attribute such a logic to reason; yet, even among them, one 
can find such persons who do not evade the concept of dialectics. What is 
more, in the works of Welsch, just to stick to his case, one can find as many 
as three forms of it, which positively refer to their own historical roots: 
Plato’s dialectics, Kantian transcendental dialectics and Hegelian dialectics 
(ibidem, 420, 427, 430). Is it possible to find a common denominator for 
these concepts despite the differences between them? First, what is read-
ily noticeable is the fact that they both indicate contradiction. Dialectics 
is a science of observing and resolving contradictions. The latter is not 
manifested only as any indifferent juxtaposition of contradictory senses 
but as an obstacle and difficulty in the realization of certain interest. That 
contradiction has the nature of a problem, riddle or an equation calling for 
the solution. Therefore, the latter seems to account for the logos of history 
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better than the judgment. Cieszkowski conceives of history as a riddle or 
a mystery. To grasp these concepts, he suggest dividing his historiosophy 
into three parts, which stem from three distinct questions (how?, what? 
and why?). To describe history, he uses the concepts referring to living 
organisms: embryo, tree and an organism. Nowadays, people more will-
ingly use the analogy to a spider web or a rhizome (ibidem, 195), which is 
aimed, as I believe, at emphasizing the aporetic moment of what is het-
erogeneous. A question as such is closer to the concept of reason (Sobota 
2004, 135–148). On the other hand, the assertion of judgment is primarily 
a function of the intellect. The basis of historical reason and traversal rea-
son is eroteric reason, which is reason in search. Cieszkowski criticized 
Hegel for the fact that the latter – instead of searching for reason in history, 
he has simply found it. It is also Welsch who emphasizes that the links be-
tween the types of rationality are not obvious; they are yet to be discovered 
(Welsch 1998, 422, 426). That active character of reason serves the purpose 
of protecting the entirety of what is heterogeneous from it being closed: 
“The entirety must be open-ended” (ibidem, 177). As Gadamer says: “the 
essence of the question is the opening of possibilities and keeping them in 
the state of being open” (Gadamer 1993, 284). That question affirms not 
only the existence of the variety of possible answers. By ordering them in 
terms of what they ask about, it always reaches beyond what is given, in 
the search of the true answer, which would not annihilate the question – 
like the solution eliminates the problem – but instead it will provide the 
question with the wider extension of its validity. The question as such has 
the intrinsic open-endedness but it is also transgressive.
Historically speaking, the feasibility of eroteric reflection of that sort 
was first pointed out by Martin Heidegger. He was followed by the rep-
resentatives of many movements of contemporary philosophy. His well-
known Seinsfrage revokes (rising them from obscurity) the significance 
of the question as such, which question combined with the traditional 
problem of metaphysics, that is being, creates the new organization of 
the philosophical discourse (Sobota 2012–2013). Its task is no longer the 
analysis, explanation, articulation, comparisons, controlling and correcting 
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or etc. but inquiring. Following Heidegger, Gadamer made the “dialectics 
of question and answer” a logical structure of hermeneutic experience. 
What is interesting is that Vattimo, whose thought was also derived from 
Heidegger and his understanding of reasoning and who inclined towards 
hermeneutics, dismissed the question about the being as the one which 
“can lead us to mysticism”, favouring “the hermeneutic or nihilistic aspect 
of Heidegger’s thought” (Vattimo 2006, 166). The concept of mysticism, 
which appeared in the form of the objection against Heidegger’s account, 
reminds us of Cieszkowski’s mysticism and combines question, reason and 
intellectual insight into one. It is also Welsch who emphasizes the intuitive 
character of reason, likening it to intuition (Spürsinn) (Welsch 1998, 426).
Talking about mysticism, it is impossible not to ask about God. It is dif-
ficult to find that concept in contemporary philosophical accounts, which 
associate the concept of Absolute with the cardinal sin or the source of 
fundamentalism. According to postmodernists, from that sin not only the 
earlier philosophy of history is suffering but also science and technology 
as well as post-war counter-cultural movements, inspired by the slogan 
of new spirituality do so. So, where one principally resigns from oneness 
and entirety, there the concept of God, which was traditionally semanti-
cally associated with these predicates, becomes very problematic indeed. 
However, it is not impossible. Especially when one takes into account the 
genesis of the contemporary awareness of pluralism, which is “a heritage 
of history” (ibidem, 252).
Already in Cieszkowski’s thought, we deal with the non-Orthodox 
attitude to the problem of God, which attitude goes far beyond what is 
proclaimed by Catholic theology. God is omni-conditionality and the foun-
dation of all the contradictions. The historical consciousness, the roots of 
which date back to Christian concept of the history of salvation, does not 
abstain from referring to theological interpretations. It is conspicuous both 
in the romantic thought of F.D. Schleiermacher, Hegel’s philosophy and 
historical school. In early Schleiermacher, faith is understood as insight 
and sentiment does not concern personal God but the infinite universe, 
infinite chaos, “in which each point represents some worlds”. Religion is 
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“historical cognition” (Schleiermacher 1995, 79). Hegelian philosophy of 
history takes advantage of the concept of Spirit as an Absolute, which mov-
ing through history, becomes a being in itself and for itself. The process of 
God approaching history results in a sort of equality of any forms of Spirit. 
In historical school the equality transforms into historical relativism. But 
even the latter does not entirely resign from the concept of God. As Gad-
amar says:
The old ideal of infinite intellect was applied to cognize history. (…) The idea 
of infinite intellect (intellectus infinitus), for which everything is simultaneous 
(omnia simul) was transformed into the prototype of historical justice. A histo-
rian, who regards all the historical epochs and phenomena as equally justified 
in the face of God, approaches it. (…) in the historical thinking, universe as 
a design of God is elevated to the rank of being conscious of itself. Obviously, 
it is not a conceptual consciousness: the ultimate result of historical science is 
»empathetic understanding and common knowledge of everything« (Gadamer 
1993, 210).
This concept of justice and of empathetic understanding recurs in post-
modern thought. In Jeana-François Lyotard, the concept of justice becomes 
an universal idea and the necessity of „the sensation of an argument” and 
“sensitivity” differences among discourses coincides with the idea of hu-
manism.11 Thus, it transpires that the idea of God, contrary to what today’s 
self-consciousness opts for, is still in effect – however obscured and un-
clear it is. It is – among others – Wilhelm Weischedel who convinces us 
how thinking about God is possible in the era of nihilism. Incidentally, he 
was the one who, in the face of reality conceived of as what is problematic 
and deprived of solid ground, suggested understanding God, with refer-
ence to early apophantic theology, as a source of any inquiry (Woher der 
Fraglichkeit):
The cognomen »God« as conceived of by the philosophical theology means 
then that the extreme problematicity leaves behind the superficial reality and 
11 For further extensive notes on the subject, see: Welsch 1996, chapter VIII. 
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thus, it proves to be the most real reality – real not in the sense of substantial 
or personal mode of existence but in the sense of absolute, making everything 
real powerless, effectiveness, which problematicity is characterized by. »God« 
is this from which radical problematicity permeates all the being and eventu-
ally inquiring as such, which puts in the state of suspense all the conjecturally 
true reality. It might be said that »God« is the origin of problematicity. Yet, the 
word »origin« should be understood as a verb: as a state of validity of radical 
problematicity (Weischedel 1994, 30).12
3. Summary
The purpose of the afore-mentioned sketch of August Cieszkowski’s his-
toriosophy with the contemporary awareness serving as the background 
was to find the spiritual concord between them. We focused our attention 
on the concept of history, and strictly speaking, on the experience of the 
dialectics of history; willing to demonstrate in which manner that key ex-
perience of XIX century acquired its counterpoint in the contemporary 
awareness of pluralism and why that was the thought by Cieszkowski that 
can help that awareness to reach self-transparentness. Did we manage it? 
The thesis we arrived at posits that the nowadays apotheosis of plurality 
is a sort of transposition of historiosophical reasoning and much of what 
is understood as plurality overlaps with the way of conceptualizing histo-
ry. Following that comparison, we were trying to signalize the existence 
of many tangential threads between Cieszkowski’s thought and the con-
temporary hermeneutic and postmodern awareness. Thus, implicite, there 
appeared the “metaphysical” reading of those movements. Certainly, the 
differences cannot be overlooked but the concept of inspiration we adopted 
involve the fact the spiritual communion is full of dialectical references.
What we left unstated is a totally different approach to research, prob-
ably, even more interesting than the one we adopted. Namely, instead of 
addressing the said transformations of the philosophy of history in post-
modernism and hermeneutic philosophy, we might have searched for the 
12 For the notes on the possibility of religion in the postmodern world see: Reli gia 1999. 
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analogy between Cieszkowski’s philosophy of history and the same con-
cept being present from the wider vantage point of contemporary thought. 
Surely, due to that vantage point being adopted, into the limelight there 
would come other historiosophical positions than the ones around which 
our present considerations were concentrated – as for example the obsolete 
movement related to “New Age Spirituality” and “The Age of Aquarius”, 
or the incendiary suggestion by Francis Fukuyama related to “the end of 
history” (Fukuyama 1996). Especially the last proposal bears a lot of resem-
blance to Cieszkowski’s thought. The considerations hereby would have at 
least one common thesis with those ones we suggest venturing as an alter-
native to the ones hereto. Namely, it is not true – what incidentally seems 
trivial but is still worth recalling – that there was an ultimate farewell to 
the philosophy of history. On the contrary. A lot seems to imply that we 
are bound to witness a true renaissance of reasoning in historiosophical 
terms, which would be even strictly related to XIX-century idea of the phi-
losophy of history. Would it entail the increasing presence and prestige of 
Cieszkowski’s thought? – the time will tell. One thing is certain. The future 
is still to be discovered.
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